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JAPAN AS A COLONIZER

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With the acquisition of the small island of Formosa in 1895, Japan joined the ranks of colonial powers. Since then she has had the island of Saghalien by the treaty of Portsmouth in 1905 and Korea by annexation last year. Besides these territories she has also in her possession the small province of Kwang-tung in the Liao Tung peninsula; and a long, narrow strip of land along the Manchurian railroad, the last two being leased from the Chinese.

In recounting what Japan has done as a colonizer I shall for several reasons devote my time to a review of what Japan has achieved in Formosa. First, because it was the first colony and as such served the purpose of colonial education for us. Second, because it may be called the only colony with which we have had any experience worth speaking about. The other colonies and possessions are so new to us that whatever policy we may have formed for them has not yet borne any fruit. And thirdly, because the administration of this island of Formosa forms a precedent for the government of later acquisitions; and also because you can infer from a description of our policy in Formosa what we shall do with other possessions and colonies. To these three reasons there is an appendix to be added—namely, because I can speak of this colony from a long and personal connection with it, and to me the last is the strongest and the best reason.

Now Formosa, or more properly, Tai-wan (since Formosa is not a Chinese nor a Japanese name, being a Portuguese appellation), was ceded to us at the termination of the Chino-

Japanese war. When accession from China was proposed by Japan, we were not at all sure that the suggestion would be complied with by the authorities. But the Chinese plenipotentiary, Li Hung Chang, took up the proposition as though it were wise on the part of his country to be freed from an incumbrance, and even commiserated Japan for acquiring it. He pointed out that the island was not amenable to good government, that brigandage could never be exterminated there, that the presence of head hunting tribes was always a menace to social order, and that the climate was not salubrious, and also that the opium habit among the people was widely spread and extreme. The island, somewhat like Sicily, had, in the course of its history, been subject to the flags of various nations; Holland, Spain and China ruled it at different times, and at one time Japanese pirates had practically usurped supreme power over it. At another time the French flag floated on its shores. Such an instability in government is enough to demoralize any people; but among the people themselves there were elements which put law and order to naught.

The indigenous population consists of head-hunters of Malay descent, who live in small communities in a very low grade of culture. The only art with which they are acquainted is agriculture, and that in a very primitive style—what the Germans name *Spatencultur*, not agriculture proper but rather what Mr. Morgan, if I remember rightly, in his *Primitive Society* calls a primitive form of horticulture. They have no ploughs; they have no draft animals; this horticulture is all that they know. But these people are very cleanly in their habits. This may be due to their Malay instinct of frequent bathing; and they keep their cottages perfectly clean, unlike other savages of a similar grade of culture. The main part of the population, however, consists of Chinese who have come from the continent and settled in Formosa. They came chiefly from the opposite shores, the province of Fukien and from the city and surroundings of Canton. It seems that the Chinese emigrants could not perpetuate their families in their new home for any number of generations, succumbing as they did to the

direct and indirect effects of malaria, and hence the Chinese population proper was constantly replenished by new arrivals from the main land. The aborigines or savages living a primitive life, constantly driven into the forest regions and high altitudes, did not increase in numbers; so when Japan assumed authority in this island she found few conditions that bespoke a hopeful outlook. The Chinese, representing two branches of their race totally different in character and in their dialects—their dialect being unintelligible one to the other—occupied the coast and the plains and were chiefly engaged in agricultural pursuits. They had a few fortified cities and towns among them; Tainan and Taihoku, with a population of about 40,000 were the most important.

The peaceful Chinese inhabitants were constantly exposed to depredations of the brigands. In fact, a great many villages, besides paying taxes to the government, had to make regular but secret tribute to the brigand for immunity from spoliation. But this is nothing peculiar to Formosa. When I was in Manchuria I found just the same thing there. Perhaps my friend, Professor Iyenaga, described to you in his speech this morning the brigandage in Manchuria. When I was there a few years ago I found that the mounted bandits often threatened the caravans which carried merchandise and silver ingots. The government could do nothing with them and so the caravans formed a kind of league, a kind of guild; and then the brigands also formed a kind of guild, and both the caravan guild and the brigand guild would send their representatives to meet somewhere; and the caravan representative would offer to pay something and say, "Now, we will pay you so many thousands of dollars a year, if you promise to spare our caravans," and the brigands would say, "All right. If you carry such and such a flag we will not attack your caravans, but we will attack other caravans that do not pay us." Thus without any action on the part of the government there is peace procured between the brigands and the caravans.

It is the same with the beggars; in Mukden I saw a number of wretched looking creatures begging from house to house. These paupers form a very strong body; they have

a delegate of their own. A number of them will stand in front of a store and of course no one will go into such a store guarded by beggars, and that store loses trade. So a number of these stores get together, form a guild and send a delegate to the guild of the beggars and say, "Please don't stand in front of our stores." Between them the two delegates settle the matter for a certain sum of money. So it was with these Formosans, in their dealings with the bandits. They paid tribute, so many dollars or so many head of cattle a year. Still the agriculturists who had their farms away from the villages, even though they were free from brigandage, were exposed to the attacks of head-hunters who would steal unawares from their haunts among the mountains to shoot anybody. I must make a digression and state that these head-hunters are very partial to Chinese heads; they say that they are easier to cut, being shaved in the back. Well, these head-hunters had a custom among them according to which young men must secure some head as a trophy without which they could not obtain recognition for bravery or celebrate any feast among their tribes. Hence the Formosan people had never known the meaning of a quiet, peaceful society or of a stable government. They had never known the security of property or of life. Successive administrations had, none of them, been able to assure them of these elementary duties of government. With a people brought up under these circumstances, patriotism was a thing entirely unknown.

In accordance with the stipulation of the treaty of Shimonoseki, one of our generals, Count Kabayama, was dispatched as governor-general of Formosa. In that capacity he was about to land at the island with a large army; when he was met by the Chinese plenipotentiary at the port of Kelung, and in an interview which took place on board of the steamer *Yokohama Maru*, the 17th of April, 1895, it was arranged that a landing should be effected without opposition. This marked the first landing of our troops since the acquisition of the island of Formosa by the Japanese. There were at that time some Imperial Chinese soldiers still remaining on the island, but on hearing of its cession to

Japan they were required to disarm and leave the country. Many did so, but a few remained to oppose our army; and then also there were a few patriots who did not feel ready to accept our terms, not ready to accept an alien rule—and these either left the island or took up arms against us.

Since there was now no government, some of the so-called patriots proclaimed a republic, one of the very few republics, (I say *one* of the very few because this is not the only case—we had a similar instance in Japan), that were started in Asia. Mr. Tang was elected president and the republic of Formosa lasted three or four months, leaving behind nothing but some post-stamps valuable for collectors. At this time the professional brigands took this opportunity of general disturbance to ply their trade. I dare say the peaceful inhabitants of the island suffered more from the hands of their own countrymen, that is, largely from Chinese troops and brigands, than they did from us. Evidence of this lies in the fact that several towns received our army with open arms as a deliverer from robbery and slaughter.

Though the island was pacified no one knew what was to happen next. We did not understand the character of the people. Very few Japanese could speak Formosan and fewer Formosans could speak Japanese. There was naturally mutual distrust and suspicion. The bandits abounded everywhere. Under these conditions military rule was the only form of government that could be adopted until better assurance could be obtained of the disposition of the people. For this purpose it was calculated that some ten million yen, I may say five million dollars, was yearly needed for the pacification and government of Formosa. Out of this necessary sum only three million yen could be obtained by taxation, according to the old régime. The balance had to be defrayed by the central, that is by the Japanese, government. Now an annual expenditure of six or seven million yen in those years, to be spent in an island away from home, with no immediate prospect of return, was by no means an easy task for the rather limited finance of Japan. You know how land values are rising everywhere. Even in Africa, England had to pay very much more than she had expected in getting

land in the south; and I think Italy has by this time found Tripoli rather more expensive than she had calculated at first. A colony that looks at a distance like the goose that lays the golden egg, on nearer approach and especially when you have to pay the bills, often proves to be a white elephant. So with us impatient people who had expected great things and great benefits to come from Formosa, began to call for more frugality and some of the very best publicists went even so far as to propose that the island of Formosa should be sold back to China or even to some other power. In the course of some thirty months, two years and a half, no less than three times were governors changed.

The first governor general was Count Kabayama, known as a hero of the Chino-Japanese war; the second was no less a man than Prince Katsura, now of some international fame as the prime minister of Japan for many years; and the third was General Nogi. Finding that the country could ill afford such a luxury as a colony, the parliament of Japan cut down its subsidy of six or seven million yen from the national treasury by about one-third, thus reducing the subsidy from six or seven million to only four million. Now who would accept a position held by a man as Nogi, but now reduced financially to two-thirds of its former prestige and power? Only a man of unbounded resources, of keen perception and quick decision, not a second or a third-rate man, would accept such a place; and Japan is forever to be congratulated on finding the right man at the right time for the right place, Viscount Kodama, who, as a member of the General Staff, had made a study of the Formosan problem and was ready to accept the governorship and to see if he could put to rights the bankrupt housekeeping of the colony. I am afraid that the name so well known among us is perhaps very much less known in this country. Kodama is a name which is cherished by our people with love and respect. Perhaps you can best remember his name if I tell you that he was the real brains of the Russo-Japanese war. It was he who actually directed the whole Japanese army in the war with Russia.

In accepting the governorship of Formosa he was particularly fortunate in the selection of his lieutenant, his assist-

ant, the civil governor; he made the discovery, as he called it, of a man who proved himself his right hand, and who actually came far above his most sanguine expectations. I mean Baron Goto, one of the rising statesmen of modern Japan. Baron Goto in the last cabinet held the position of Minister of Communications and was President of the Railway Board. Until Baron Goto was made civil governor of Formosa under Kodama he had been known as an expert on hygiene, having been a medical doctor. The advent of these two men in Formosa marked a new era in our colonial administration. Upon entering their new post of duty early in 1898, the first thing they did was the practical suspension of military rule; at least it was made subservient to civil administration. Military rule is apt to become harsh and to the Chinese especially, who are not accustomed to respect the army, it is doubly harsh.

Next, Kodama and Goto, to whom English colonial service was an inspiring example, surprised the official world by a summary discharge of over one thousand public servants of high and low degrees, and collected about them men known and tried for their knowledge and integrity. They used to say often and often, "It is the man who rules and not red tape." In an old and well settled country "red tape" may be convenient, but in a new colony great latitude of power and initiative must be left to responsible men. I emphasize this point because these men, I mean the governor general and the civil governor, attributed their success largely to the selection and use of right men.

Brigandage was still rampant when Kodama went to Formosa, and with military rule in abeyance there was some likelihood of its growing worse. To offset this, the constabulary department was organized and made efficient by proper care in choosing men for the police and by educating them in the language, and in the rudiments of law and industries, for their arduous tasks. Exceedingly arduous were their callings, since these policemen were required not only to represent law and order but they were expected to be teachers. They kept account, for instance, of every man, and they watched over every man and woman who smoked opium;

they had to be acquainted with children of school age and know which children went to school and which did not. Moreover, they were required to teach the parents the rudiments of entomology. I do not know how policemen in this country are educated; but I think they are better educated, though perhaps not in entomology and hygiene. But our Formosan police were expected to teach the people how to take care of themselves, and especially about pests, about disinfection, and about lots of other things that would scarcely be required of any policeman in any other part of the world. Moreover these policemen were required to live in a village where there were no Japanese, just a purely Formosan village, alone or sometimes with their wives. Of course the policemen were required to know the language and to speak it. Now under civil administration armies were not mobilized against brigands, and if there was any trouble it was the policemen who had to go and settle brigandage. But the brigands were invited to subject themselves to law and if they surrendered their arms they were assured not only of protection but against hunger. Not a few leaders took the hint and were given special privileges, so that they were assured of a future living. Those who resisted to the end were necessarily treated as disturbers and as criminals. Twelve years ago brigandage was so rampant that the capital of Formosa, Taihoku, was assaulted by them; but in the last ten years we scarcely hear of it. I went to Taihoku ten years ago and whenever I went a few miles out of the city half a dozen policemen armed with rifles used to accompany me for my protection. But in the last five or six years a young girl can travel from one end of the island to the other, of course excluding savage or aboriginal districts, of which I shall speak later.

Thus what Li-Hung-Chang in the conference of Shimonoseki said, turned out to be of no consequence. According to him brigandage was something inherent in the social constitution of Formosa. He said it was something that could not be uprooted in the island; yet here is Formosa to-day with not a trace of brigandage. That is one of the first things which was accomplished by Japan as a colonizer.

Then another great evil in the island to which Li-Hung-Chang alluded was the opium smoking. When the island was taken, it was a favorite subject for discussion among our people. Some said opium smoking must be abolished at once by law. Others said, "No, no, let it alone; it is something from which the Chinese cannot free themselves; let them smoke and smoke to death." What took Baron Goto for the first time to Formosa was the desire to study the question of opium-smoking from a medical standpoint; and the plan he drew up was the gradual suppression of the smoking habit, and the *modus operandi* was the control of the production—this was to be done by the government, because, if the government monopolizes the production and manufacture of opium, it can restrict the quantity and also it can improve the quality so as to make it less harmful. A long list of all those who were addicted to this habit was compiled, and only those who were confirmed smokers were given permission to buy opium. People who never smoked opium before, or children, were not allowed to buy, much less to smoke opium, and strict surveillance was to be instituted by the policeman, who, as I mentioned before, knows every man in the village. The annual returns made of the confirmed smokers and of the quantity consumed in the island show distinct and gradual decrease of opium. At one time the number of smokers was, in round numbers, 170,000. In ten years the older ones died off and younger ones did not come to take their place; so there is constant diminution. In ten years the number decreased from 170,000 to 130,000; and now it is about 110,000. So there is this constant annual decrease and that, we think, is the only right way to do away with this habit. It may interest you, perhaps, to know that American commissioners from the Philippine Islands came to study our system. When I met them they expressed much satisfaction and I dare say they are going to have the same system introduced in the Philippines, for the Chinese in these islands. Thus the second evil which Li-Hung-Chang said was inherent to Formosa also disappeared, or rather is fast disappearing.

There are two more obstacles which we consider are in the

way of the further development of the island of Formosa; these are, first the mosquito and second, the savages. By mosquitoes I mean especially the anopheles, the malaria-bearing mosquito. Malaria is the greatest obstacle in the way of developing the resources of the island. The Japanese immigrants who have come suffer, I may say one-third of them, from malaria. If I want labor and if I take with me 100 Japanese laborers to Formosa, I can count on the efficiency of only 60 or 70, because one-third of the laborers must be expected to be sick with malaria. Hygienic and sanitary measures are vigorously enforced but this can be done only in the larger cities. In the city or rather the capital of Taihoku, they made a very perfect sewage system; they tore down the old castle walls and used the stones in making the sewage ditches, and ever since then the number of people suffering from malaria has decreased greatly. In fact, it is said that malaria has disappeared from the city. Careful observations resulted in substantiating the fact that among the mosquitoes in this city less than 1 per cent belonged to the dangerous species of anopheles. The rest of the mosquitoes are harmless, that is to say, as far as malaria is concerned. Then also, speaking of sanitation, I am reminded of what we have done against the pest; the pest, or the bubonic plague, was a very common disease there, but in the last four years we hear nothing of it. By constant care and by strict enforcement of sanitary laws is the pest now eradicated or near eradication.

But as to the aborigines, or the savages of Formosa we cannot say we have nearly eradicated them. They belong to the Malay race and are fierce and brave. As I have said before, they live in the mountains; they never live on the plains. And when they want a head they steal down, hide themselves among the underbrush or among the branches of trees, and shoot the first Chinese or Japanese that passes by. In fact I knew of a savage who had his rifle so placed on a rock that he could shoot any person who happened to walk past in just a certain direction and at a certain height; and there he waited for days and days for somebody to walk right within his range; and he succeeded in getting a head! With

such people it is practically impossible to do anything. In number they must be over 100,000; we cannot count them, but we are pretty sure there are 115,000. Repeated attempts we have made but we never have succeeded thus far in doing much damage to them, though they have succeeded in doing much damage to us.

All that we can do and all that we are doing, in order to prevent their descending from among the heights, is to place a wire fence on the ridge of the hills. Barbed wire was used at first, but now we use a wire fence which is not barbed but is of ordinary wire with a strong electric current running through it. That may sound very savage to you, but it is the only way that we can keep them off from us. I have been in this place and seen the fences. The wire is strung on posts about five feet high; there are four wires with a foot between them, and a strong electric current running through. At first they tried their best to get over the fence, but they have learned not to approach it. This wire fence stretches a distance of some three hundred miles. It costs several thousand dollars; yet every year we build this fence some miles further in. The next year we go another stretch, so that their dominion will be more and more confined to the very tops of the mountains. Of course I do not wish to give you an impression that we are dealing harshly with them, because we offer them their choice. We say, "If you come down and don't indulge in head-hunting we will welcome you as a brother,"—because they are brothers. These savages look more like Japanese than Chinese and they themselves say of the Japanese that we Japanese are their kin and that the Chinese are their enemies. Because the Chinese wear their queues they think that their heads are especially made to be hunted. And now every year, as I say, we are getting a better control over them by this constant moving of the wire fence and by the salt-famine for they have no salt since they are cut off from the sea-shore; they raise their rice, they raise millet, they have their own animals, and so they do not want food, but what they want badly is salt. So we say, "We will give you salt if you will come down and give up your arms;" and tribe after tribe has recognized our

power and has submitted itself to Japanese rule. Then we build them houses, we give them agricultural tools and implements, give them land, and let them continue their own peaceful ways of livelihood.

Thus I have dwelt in a very sketchy, very unsatisfactory way, on the four points to which Li-Hung-Chang in the conference at Shimonoseki alluded as great obstacles in the way of developing Formosa. What now is the result? At first we could not manage a colony with the money that we could raise in the island; every year we had to get some subsidy from the national treasury. It was expected that such a subsidy was necessary until 1910. But by the development of Formosan industries, especially of rice and of tea, (of Oolong tea, for which you are the best customer, because Oolong tea is made chiefly for American export), by developing the camphor industry (because all the camphor that you use, if not artificial, is produced in Formosa); by developing sugar, the production of which was increased five-fold in the last ten years (a tremendous increase for any country in any industry)—by developing these industries, we can get money enough in the island to do all the work that is needed to be done there. By this I mean that irrigation work, for instance, is now being carried out on a large scale. Then there is the improvement of the harbors; both in the north, at Kelung, and in the south, at Takao, commodious and deep harbors are now being constructed or improved. We have built a railroad from one end of the island to the other. Schools and hospitals are now to be met with in every village and town. Then the police attend to the health, to the industries, and to the education of the people. In all these things we think that we have succeeded quite well, especially when we compare our colony of Formosa with the experiments that other nations are making. We often speak of English colonies as being models; we speak of French colonies as examples not to be followed; and we are looking to your experiment in the Philippines to find what it will amount to. Comparing our Formosa with the colonies of these different powers, we have good reason to congratulate ourselves.

I have made a very rough, sketchy address this afternoon. I have only tried to show what were the general lines of policy pursued in the development of Formosa. We have been successful. A colony was at first thought to be a luxury, but now Formosa is to us a necessity. The example that we set there in that island will be followed in other colonies of ours. I may say that the general lines of the colonial policy of Formosa were first of all, the defense of the island. So much is said about our increased navy, some people in this country think that we are increasing our navy in order to attack San Francisco or Manila; but with the acquisition of Formosa, of the island of Saghalien, and of Korea, our coast line has increased immensely and yet our increased navy is not sufficient for the proper defence of all the coast lines that we have, for the first great object in the colonial policy of Formosa, and I may say of Japan, is the defence of the new territory.

The second is the protection of property and life, and the dissemination of legal institutions. People unaccustomed to the protection of law feel as though it were despotism. But they will soon find out that, after all, good government and good laws are the safeguard of life and property, and we have to teach in Korea as well as in Formosa what government and what laws are.

Then the third point is the protection of health. I have spoken to you of what we have done in Formosa; similar lines of policy will be pursued in Korea. When I saw Prince Ito in Seoul and when I told him that the population in Korea had not increased in the last hundred years and that perhaps the Korean race was destined to disappear, he said, "Well, I am not sure. I wish to see whether good laws will increase the fecundity of the Korean people." In Formosa it was a very well known fact that without new recruits coming from the mainland of China the population would diminish. There were more deaths than births. But since we assumed sovereignty there annual returns show a gradual increase of births over deaths; hence, as I said, the third great point in the colonial policy of Japan is the protection of health.

The fourth is the encouragement of industries. In Formosa the government has done much to improve the quality as well as the quantity of rice, and to improve irrigation. The improvements in the sugar industry which have been made were suggested by the government. When the work was started ten years ago we got sixty tons of cuttings from Hawaii; and we have about twenty mills, the machinery being imported from Germany, England and Hawaii. The experiments in the manufacture of sugar were also made by the government and when the experiments resulted in improvement, this was told to the people; experts were sent out to the different villages, preaching the advantages of better culture. So with other branches of industry. The government is constantly encouraging the people to make improvements.

And then the fifth policy is that of education. In Formosa we have just reached the stage when we are taking up education seriously. We could not do it before this, because our idea was first of all to give to those new people something which will satisfy their hunger and thirst; their bodies must be nourished before their minds. And now that the economic condition has improved in the last year or two, schools are being started in all the villages.

These broad lines of colonial policy which we have practised with good results in Formosa, will be transferred in Korea. We do not trouble ourselves about the question of assimilation. In the last number of the *JOURNAL OF RACE DEVELOPMENT* published by this University, I read an article by Mr. MacKay, British consul in Formosa. He concludes his article by expressing two doubts, namely: one in regard to the commingling of races, that is, Chinese and Formosans; and second, in regard to the Japanization of the Formosans. He doubts whether either will take place. Well, as far as the Japanese are concerned, we do not trouble ourselves about these questions. I think assimilation will be found easier in Korea because the Korean race is very much allied to our own. In Formosa, assimilation will be out of the question for long years to come and we shall not try to force it. The idea is that we put no pressure upon them, with the object of

assimilation or Japanization in view. Our idea is to provide a Japanese milieu, so to speak, and if people come and if they assimilate themselves, well and good. We have a proverb in Japan which says, "He who flees is not pursued, but he who comes is not repulsed." If the Formosans or the Koreans come to us, we will not repulse them. We will take them with open arms and we will hold them as our brothers, but we will not pursue them. We leave their customs and manners just as they like to have them. Our principle is firm government and free society. Firmness in government is something which they did not have before, and that is what we offer to them.

And therefore I beg of Americans who are interested in the development of Japan as a colonial power, not to be misled by reports which now and then appear in different periodicals and newspapers by critics of all nationalities and of all countries. I have often read articles written by foreign critics who speak of our administration in Korea as a failure. A well educated man, an American, wrote that in Formosa the people are very much opposed to the Japanese government, are very much dissatisfied with it. If I were to go among the farmers in the west of this country and ask, "Are you satisfied with Mr. Taft's administration?" they would say "Yes, we are." But if I were to press the question. "Do you think there is something to improve?" "Of course," the farmers will say, "I do not think Mr. Taft's administration is *perfect*." Well, I may note down in my book that the American people are dissatisfied with Mr. Taft and may rise against him at any moment. Such a rumor you may hear from time to time in any newspaper about any country; but as our adage has it—"Proof is stronger than argument;" and I have given but a few proofs, though, if time allowed, I could give more.